Design Features for Linguistically-Mediated Meaning Construction: The Relative Roles of the Linguistic and Conceptual Systems in Subserving the Ideational Function of Language by Vyvyan Evans
fpsyg-07-00156 February 17, 2016 Time: 20:7 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH




University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Reviewed by:
Stefan Hartmann,







This article was submitted to
Language Sciences,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 14 August 2015
Accepted: 27 January 2016
Published: 19 February 2016
Citation:
Evans V (2016) Design Features
for Linguistically-Mediated Meaning
Construction: The Relative Roles
of the Linguistic and Conceptual






Construction: The Relative Roles of
the Linguistic and Conceptual
Systems in Subserving the Ideational
Function of Language
Vyvyan Evans*
Bangor University, Bangor, UK
Recent research in language and cognitive science proposes that the linguistic system
evolved to provide an “executive” control system on the evolutionarily more ancient
conceptual system (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2008; Evans, 2009, 2015a,b; Bergen, 2012).
In short, the claim is that embodied representations in the linguistic system interface
with non-linguistic representations in the conceptual system, facilitating rich meanings,
or simulations, enabling linguistically mediated communication. In this paper I build
on these proposals by examining the nature of what I identify as design features for
this control system. In particular, I address how the ideational function of language—
our ability to deploy linguistic symbols to convey meanings of great complexity—is
facilitated. The central proposal of this paper is as follows. The linguistic system
of any given language user, of any given linguistic system—spoken or signed—
facilitates access to knowledge representation—concepts—in the conceptual system,
which subserves this ideational function. In the most general terms, the human
meaning-making capacity is underpinned by two distinct, although tightly coupled
representational systems: the conceptual system and the linguistic system. Each
system contributes to meaning construction in qualitatively distinct ways. This leads
to the first design feature: given that the two systems are representational—they are
populated by semantic representations—the nature and function of the representations
are qualitatively different. This proposed design feature I term the bifurcation in semantic
representation. After all, it stands to reason that if a linguistic system has a different
function, vis-à-vis the conceptual system, which is of far greater evolutionary antiquity,
then the semantic representations will be complementary, and as such, qualitatively
different, reflecting the functional distinctions of the two systems, in collectively giving
rise to meaning. I consider the nature of these qualitatively distinct representations. And
second, language itself is adapted to the conceptual system—the semantic potential—
that it marshals in the meaning construction process. Hence, a linguistic system itself
exhibits a bifurcation, in terms of the symbolic resources at its disposal. This design
feature I dub the birfucation in linguistic organization. As I shall argue, this relates to
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two distinct reference strategies available for symbolic encoding in language: what I dub
words-to-world reference and words-to-words reference. In slightly different terms, this
design feature of language amounts to a distinction between a lexical subsystem, and
a grammatical subsystem.
Keywords: meaning construction, language faculty, access semantics, LCCM theory, design features for meaning
INTRODUCTION
This paper relates to broad research programme concerning the
nature of the human capacity for language, and investigating
what makes language special. For much of the second half
of the twentieth century investigating this capacity has often
been driven, in general terms, by asking the following question:
What is the nature of language? One response to this question,
and the prevailing view in Anglo–American language science,
at least until relatively recently, was that it would ultimately
be possible to identify principles, specific to language, that
accounted for what makes it unique (e.g., Hauser et al., 2002).
In particular, such principles were presumed to make language
functionally distinct from other aspects of human cognition, as
well as qualitatively distinct from, and functionally far more
sophisticated than the communicative systems exhibited by
other species. And these principles were assumed to be part
of the human genetic-endowment. This functional specificity—
a species-specific feature of the human mind—is often referred
to as the language faculty, and is embodied most notably in the
tradition pioneered by Chomsky (1965), and thereafter.
In this paper, I propose a somewhat different perspective.
And this arises as I begin, by asking a slightly different
question. My starting point is to ask: what is language for? It is
presumably unarguable that, from the perspective of language as
a communicative system, it exhibits two main functions. The first
can be characterized as an ideational function: language serves
to convey ideas, ranging from stating one’s name, making an
idle comment on the weather, to declaring undying love (e.g.,
Evans, 2009, 2015b). And the second can be characterized as
an interactive-interpersonal function (e.g., Levinson, 2006; Heine
and Kuteva, 2007; Tomasello, 2008). Here language serves to
signal intentional actions: actions in the sense that linguistic
utterances have illocutionary force (Searle, 1969)—they attempt
to influence the mental states, wishes, feelings and behavior of our
interlocutor, influencing and even changing aspects of the world
in the process.
Evidence for the interpersonal-interactive function of
language comes from grammatical organization, as well as
language-specific discourse conventions, demonstrating that
language is fundamentally dyadic in nature. For instance,
the languages of the world virtually all appear to include a
pronoun system that maintains a role for second-person (‘you’).
Seemingly universal aspects of linguistic organization such as
interrogatives (questions), imperatives (commands), and deontic
modality (e.g., You may. . .), provide linguistic resources that
seek to influence others (Heine and Kuteva, 2007). Moreover,
knowledge of language use includes a complex system of
turn-taking conventions associated with competent language
use during ongoing discourse (Sacks et al., 1974; Sacks, 1992).
Finally, languages appear to universally assume a speaker-hearer
distinction. The distinction in English, for instance, between
definite vs. indefinite articles (e.g., the vs. a), is evidence of this:
the use of the indefinite article signals that while the entity being
referred to is known by the speaker, it is left as unidentified
for the hearer. Similarly, spatial deictic expressions—terms that
take their reference from the speaker’s spatial location, ‘deictic’
derives from the Greek deixis, meaning ‘pointing’—in languages
often assume a speaker-hearer dichotomy.
An example of spatial deixis, in English, isthe deictic
expression this, which designates something proximal to speaker
(and hearer), while that points to an entity that is distal.
Some language have spatial deictics that disambiguate between
proximity and distance from speaker and hearer, for instance
‘close to speaker, but not hearer,’ and ‘distal to speaker, but
not hearer.’ Lexical items such as these again point to an
organizational principle involving a speaker/hearer, and hence an
interpersonal-interactive context.
For language to facilitate its interactive-interpersonal
function, it stands to reason that language must have evolved as
a means of expressing ideational complexity (Hurford, 2007).
After all, we can, presumably, only influence the mental states
of others once we have a fairly sophisticated symbolic means of
expressing our own thoughts and feelings, in a bid to encode
and externalize these, in order to have an impact on others
and the world around us. And while the two communicative
functions may have co-evolved—the interpersonal-interactive
function may have led to increased ideational complexity, a more
sophisticated means of expressing ideational complexity, in turn,
enhanced our ability to engage interactively with others (e.g.,
Deacon, 1997; Hurford, 2012; Evans, 2015b)—in this paper, I
primarily focus on the ideational function of language.
In particular, I argue that language, in fulfilling its ideational
function, takes advantage of the semantic potential of the
evolutionarily prior conceptual system, a system that, in outline
at least, we share with other great apes—gorillas, chimpanzees,
bonobos, and orangutans—primates more generally, and indeed,
many other mammalian species (e.g., Barsalou, 2005; Call and
Tomasello, 2008; Hurford, 2012). From this perspective, what
makes language special is not that it is functionally distinct,
for instance, an informationally encapsulated faculty or module
of mind (e.g., Fodor, 1983). On the contrary, the linguistic
system of any given language user, of any given linguistic
system—spoken or signed—facilitates access to knowledge
representation—concepts—in the conceptual system, in order to
construct meaning, during the course of communication. The
relationship, then, between a linguistic system, and the human
conceptual system, is that of a symbiotic assembly, co-evolved
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and co-adapted in order to enable meaning construction in
the course of communication (Evans, 2015a,b). In order to
achieve this, this meaning-making complex exhibits a number of
design features, facilitating meaning construction. In this article I
examine the two central design features of this meaning-making
complex, which enable human meaning construction: the design
features for a bifurcation in semantic representation, and for a
bifurcation in linguistic organization.
In the most general terms, the human meaning-making
capacity is underpinned by two distinct, although tightly
coupled representational systems: the conceptual system and
the linguistic system. Each system contributes to meaning
construction in qualitatively distinct ways. This leads to the first
design feature: given that the two systems are representational—
they are populated by semantic representations—the nature and
function of the representations are qualitatively different (see The
Bifurcation in Semantic Representation Design Feature). After
all, it stands to reason that if a linguistic system has a different
function, vis-à-vis the conceptual system, which is of far greater
evolutionary antiquity, then the semantic representations will be
complementary, and as such, qualitatively different, reflecting
the functional distinctions of the two systems, in collectively
giving rise to meaning. I consider the nature of these qualitatively
distinct representations.
Second, language itself is adapted to the conceptual system—
the semantic potential—that it marshals in the meaning
construction process (see The Bifurcation in Linguistic
Organization Design Feature). Hence, a linguistic system
itself exhibits a bifurcation, in terms of the symbolic resources at
its disposal. As I shall argue, this relates to two distinct reference
strategies available for symbolic encoding in language: what I
dub words-to-world reference and words-to-words reference. In
slightly different terms, this design feature of language amounts
to a distinction between a lexical subsystem, and a grammatical
subsystem.
BACKGROUND
In this section I present the proposal that the conceptual and
linguistic systems have distinct, albeit complementary, functions
in subserving the ideational function of language. This section
provides the necessary background for discussion of the two
design features, that enable this, later in the paper.
The Conceptual and Linguistic Systems
In previous work (Evans, 2009, 2015b), I have argued that
human-like meaning-making is contingent upon a bifurcation
in the two representational systems upon which linguistically
mediated communication depends. Linguistic communication is
contingent on an evolutionarily prior conceptual system. The
human conceptual system, shared, at least in outline with the
other great apes, evolved not for communication, but rather
for functions such as reason, choice, learning, categorization
and advance planning, in the quotidian world of threat and
opportunity (Evans, 2009). Much later, and probably for much
of the 2.8 million years of the evolutionary trajectory of
the genus Homo, a linguistic system has been evolving—
built on the cooperative intelligence that emerged with the
genus Homo (Evans, 2015b; see Deacon, 1997; Tomasello,
2014). And the linguistic system makes use of the qualitatively
distinct representational format of the conceptual system,
for purposes of communication. On this account, language
provides a means of bootstrapping representations in the
conceptual system for linguistically mediated communication
(Evans, 2015a,b).
Our species shares in outline, especially with the other great
apes, a complex conceptual system (e.g., Barsalou, 2005; Hurford,
2007, 2012; Evans, 2009). A conceptual system evolved not for
communication, but for a range of more pressing, quotidian
concerns, such as categorization, learning, forward-planning,
way finding, and so on (Barsalou, 1992). But while many higher-
order species possess sophisticated conceptual systems, humans
appear to be alone in possessing language (e.g., Evans, 2014).
In addition, the conceptual prowess of humans, as manifested,
perhaps most notably, by the ideational and material culture
characteristics of all human groups, is both quantitatively and
qualitatively distinct from any other extant species (Tomasello,
1999, 2014).
One implication of this fact is that it may be language—and
the cognitive and biological changes that were necessitated by it
over the 2.8 million years of the ancestral human evolutionary
trajectory—that has provided the sine qua non: language may be
the key in unlocking the otherwise mute semantic potential of
the human conceptual system (see, for instance, Mithen, 1996;
Deacon, 1997; Evans, 2015b).
From this perspective, a linguistic system provides our species
with added value: it provides an “executive” control function—an
idea I shall develop during the course of the paper, operating over
embodied concepts in the conceptual system (Barsalou, 2005;
Barsalou et al., 2008; see also Evans, 2009). The idea I advance
here is that language provides the framework that facilitates
the composition of concepts for purposes of communication.
This is achieved as language consists of a grammatical system,
with words and grammatical constructions cueing activations of
specific body-based states in the brain (Bergen, 2012: Chapter 5).
On this account, language allows us to control and manipulate the
conceptual system, which, after all, must have originally evolved
for more rudimentary functions, such as object recognition and
classification. Under the control of language, we can make use of
body-based (not exclusively sensorimotor) concepts in order to
develop abstract thought.
In short, representations in the linguistic system co-conspire
with representations in the conceptual system in the process
of meaning construction. And accordingly, the linguistic
representations must have evolved to complement concepts in
the conceptual system; accordingly, it stands to reason that
the nature of linguistic representations must have a different
quality from the rich, multimodal concepts in the conceptual
system. After all, if language really does provide an executive
control function, specialized for tapping into the conceptual
system’s meaning potential, then it stands to reason that language
evolved a complementary function; the nature of semantic
representation in language must be qualitatively different from
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the representations—concepts—that populate the conceptual
system.
Evidence for the Embodied Nature of
Concepts
Before continuing, I briefly review some of the evidence
for thinking that the conceptual system is populated by
representations that are embodied in nature. The embodied
(or grounded) embodied cognition account of concepts blurs
the distinction between perception/interoception and cognition
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999, for an early, influential account). On this
view, concepts are directly grounded in the perceptual and
interoceptive brain states that give rise to them. This embodied
cognition perspective takes a modal view of concepts: the
semantic substrate of concepts is directly grounded in, and arises
from, the sorts of modalities that the concept is a representation
of (see Barsalou, 2008 and Shapiro, 2010 for reviews. Notable
exemplars of this view include e.g., Damasio, 1994; Clark,
1997; Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999;
Zwaan, 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Chemero, 2009; Evans,
2009; Vigliocco et al., 2009).
The embodied cognition view assumes that concepts arise
directly from the perceptual experiences themselves. Take the
example of the experience of dogs. When we perceive and interact
with dogs, this leads to extraction of perceptual and functional
attributes of dogs, which are stored in memory in analog
fashion: our concept for ‘dog,’ on this view, closely resembles
our perception and experience of a dog. When we imagine a
dog, this is made possible by reactivating, or to use the technical
term, simulating the perceptual and interoceptive experience of
interacting with a dog—these include sensorimotor experiences
when we pat and otherwise interact with a dog, as well as affective
states, such as the pleasure we experience when a dog responds by
wagging its tail, and so forth. But while the simulated dog closely
resembles our conscious perceptual and interoceptive experience,
it is, according to embodyists, attenuated.
In other words, the concept for ‘dog’ is not the same as the
vivid experience of perceiving a dog. When we close our eyes
and imagine a dog, we are at liberty to simulate an individual
dog—perhaps our own pet—or a type of dog, or a dog composed
of aspects of our past experiences of and with dogs. But the
simulation is attenuated with respect to the perceptual experience
of a dog—it doesn’t have the same vivid richness that comes with
directly perceiving a dog in the flesh.
Importantly, the claim made by the embodied cognition
perspective is that the simulation is directly grounded in the
same brain states—in fact, a reactivation of aspects of the
brain states—that are active when we perceive and interact
with the dog. The simulation is then available for language and
thought processes. As the reactivation of some aspects of the
perceptual and interoceptive experiences of a dog is, in part,
constitutive of the concept for ‘dog,’ the concept is an analog
of the perceptual experience. It is analog in the sense that it is
very much like our perceptual experience of dogs: the concept
must, in part, be constituted of body-based representations—
the sensorimotor experiences that comprise our perceptual
experience—and, therefore, must be stored in the broadly the
same brain regions that process the perceptual experience to
begin with. This constitutes an embodied perspective as concepts
are made-up, in part, of the very same body-based experiences
that comprise our perceptual and interoceptive experiences.
Two main lines of empirical evidence suggest that the
embodied cognition view of concepts, rather than the
disembodied account, is on the right track. These relate to
how the brain processes concepts, and how human subjects
perform in behavioral tasks, when they must call up conceptual
representations. Together, these two lines of evidence strongly
suggest that concepts make use of the same brain regions
that process the perceptual experiences that the concepts are
representations of: it doesn’t matter whether you are perceiving
a particular experience (percept), or later, thinking about it
after the event (concept), the same brain states are activated
in both cases. This suggests that the same mental substrate
that underpins perception also underpins cognition, and our
representations (or concepts) of perceptual experiences.
Brain-based demonstrations reveal that the brain’s
sensorimotor and other modal systems—systems that are
activated when we perceive a particular experience—are also
activated during conceptual processing—when we think about
or recall the experience, or even when we use or understand
language relating to the experience. As we shall below, for
instance, motor regions of the brain that are deployed for
perceiving a particular tool, such as a hammer, and the way it is
used, are automatically activated during non-perceptual tasks,
such as thinking or talking about hammering. In short, a raft of
studies provides clear evidence that the same motor processes
in the brain are automatically engaged when subjects perform
perceptual and conceptual tasks (Barsalou, 2003, 2008; Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Pulvermüller
et al., 2005; Boulenger et al., 2008).
Behavioral demonstrations involve applying a stimulus of
some kind to human subjects, and then observing their behavior
when performing a particular task. Many of the relevant studies
have involved sentence comprehension and lexical decision tasks
(and I will have more to say about the relationship between
language and concepts below).
However, one representative and important study required
subjects to perform a lexical decision task employing action
verbs relating to either arm or leg actions (Pulvermüller et al.,
2005). The experiment made use of a technique, in cognitive
neuroscience, known as transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS). This is a non-invasive technique that involves passing a
weak electric current, using electrodes attached to the scalp, to
specific brain regions in order to stimulate them.
Subjects were asked to read words that related either to
arm movement, such as punch, or leg movement, like kick.
Immediately after reading, the TMS pulse was passed through
either the leg region of the brain’s motor cortex or the arm region.
Subjects were then asked to signal when they had understood
the word. The experimenters found that when subjects received
a pulse to the ‘arm’ region of the brain, they processed arm words
more quickly. And when exposed to an electric current to the
leg region, they understood leg words more quickly. What this
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reveals is that words—which relate to mental representations,
concepts—were influenced by activation of the perceptual areas
of the brain dedicated to perceiving either leg or arm actions. And
consequently, this provides powerful evidence that perceptual
experiences underpin conceptual representations, as manifested
in language.
The Nature of Simulations
If the linguistic and conceptual systems together constitute
a meaning-making complex, how do simulations arise?
A linguistically mediated simulation is a general purpose
computation, performed by the brain, which provides language
users with an approximation of a speaker’s linguistically mediated
communicative intention.
The proposal is that words and other linguistic symbols are
in fact cues that guide the way in which body-based states
processed and stored by the brain are composed, in order to
facilitate linguistically mediated meaning construction (Glenberg
and Robertson, 1999; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Evans, 2009,
2013; Bergen, 2012: chapter 5). To illustrate, consider the use of
red in the following example sentences:
(1a) The actress put on her red lipstick.
(1b) The red fox jumped over the stream.
In the first example, the use of red evokes a bright, vivid red.
In the second, a dun or browny red is typically called to mind.
This reveals that the meaning, or, more precisely, the perceptual
simulation of red, is not, in any sense, there in the word. After
all, red could, in principle, lead to activation of the full panoply
of distinct hues we normally associate with red. These range, for
instance, from the orange-red of fire, to the auburn-red of henna,
to the crimson-red of blood, to the truly red of lipstick, and so
forth. Knowledge of all these different shades arises from our
interaction in and with the world, which we can, in principle,
call to mind, and visualize in our mind’s eye in the absence of
language.
In these sentences, the word red provides access to this
meaning potential: all our stored experiences for red. But while
the sensory experience of redness is not coming from language
itself, the word cues the perceptual and interoceptive states stored
in the brain, associated with red in all its glory. And these body-
based states are reactivated during language use. Put another way,
the word form red gives rise to distinct simulations for different
hues of red.
But importantly, what’s remarkable about the
meaning-making complex—the linguistic and conceptual
systems-assembly—is that the sentences in (1) enable us to
construct just the right shade of red: a contextually appropriate
shade. The linguistic context, in each sentence, guides the
construction of the simulation, such that we obtain the ‘correct’
perceptual hue in each case.
The Bifurcation in Semantic Representation Design
Feature
If the function of language is to index or activate body-
based concepts in the conceptual system, what is the difference
between representations in the conceptual system vis-à-vis
those in the linguistic system? The first design feature of
linguistically mediated meaning construction, I argue in this
section, constitutes a qualitative distinction in the two types of
representation: the design feature for a bifurcation in semantic
representation. This distinction I operationalise in terms of analog
knowledge (indigenous to the conceptual system), and parametric
knowledge (indigenous to the linguistic system).
Arguments for Semantic
Representations Indigenous to Language
There are a number of reasons for thinking that language comes
equipped with semantic representations that are distinct from
those that reside in the conceptual system—embodied concepts.
I briefly review five here, based on Evans (2015a).
First, if language had no indigenous semantic content, we
would be unable to use language to evoke ideas we haven’t yet
experienced. This follows as the brain states wouldn’t yet exist
for the corresponding experiences. But, it appears to be the
case that language can do just that, facilitating the evocation
of just those experiences not yet witnessed (Taylor and Zwaan,
2009; Vigliocco et al., 2009). For instance, I can describe a
dance move to someone, using language, and more or less
convey the move, even though my interlocutor may have never
had previous experience of the move. While seeing and acting
provide a directly perceived, multimodal context, enabling the
formation of conceptual representations, an approximation can
nevertheless be facilitated via language. While direct experience
of the dance move—the experience of seeing, acting, and
interacting, gives rise to body-based representations that are
analog in nature—language, in contrast, doesn’t work like that.
The representations are more sketchy. Nevertheless, language
can be used, even in the absence of prior experience, in order
to evoke a partial representation of the dance move. This
demonstrates that conceptualisations can arise via the medium
of language.
Second, although activations of body-based brain states arise
automatically in response to language use, they are not necessary
for language to be successfully used. Patients with Parkinson’s
and motor neuron disease display difficulty in carrying out
motor movements, as motor representations in the brain are
damaged. Yet, both sets of patients are able to use and understand
corresponding action verbs (Bak et al., 2001; Boulenger et al.,
2008). This reveals that simulations arise not just from embodied
brain states.
Third, language itself appears to encode a type of semantic
representation that is qualitatively distinct from the sorts of
rich, multimodal representations that populate the conceptual
system. Consider, for instance, the semantic divergence between
the use of the definite article, the, with the indefinite, a. One
key distinction concerns specificity, as well as whether the
information being introduced is already present or not, in the
current discourse: whether the subject under discussion is given
or new. That said, the and a don’t have specific referents in
the world, nor are they ideas that can be visualized, in the way
that, say the noun dog, or even a scene associated with the more
abstract nominal jealousy can be visualized.
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What this reveals is that so-called grammatical or function
words appear to provide a relatively schematic semantic
representation: a type of content that is qualitatively distinct from
concepts. The grammatical structure of language may provide
an indigenous level of semantic representation, distinct from
non-linguistic concepts.
Fourth, language appears to directly influence perception.
In one study, the distinction in the linguistic encoding of
color was exploited to investigate the non-linguistic effects of
language (Thierry et al., 2009). It was found that differences
across languages, for instance, Greek vs. English, in terms of
encoding of monolexemic color terms led to distinctions in
the perception and categorisation of color space. This finding
strongly suggests that language provides semantic content
independent of the conceptual system, consequently leading to
the cognitive restructuring in non-linguistic cognition.
The fifth reason relates to what I have termed, in earlier
work, the illusion of semantic unity (Evans, 2009). Otherwise
distinct aspects of semantic space can, under the influence
of language, come to be viewed as unified. For instance, the
polysemy exhibited by language can relate a number of distinct
semantic parameters, providing the appearance of homogeneity.
Take the English lexical item over, as in the following examples:
(2a) The lamp is over the table ‘above’
(2b) The ball landed over the wall ‘on the other side’
(2c) The clouds are over the sun ‘covering/occluding’
(2d) The relationship is over ‘completion’
What these examples reveal is that in English a variety of distinct
semantic parameters—‘above,’ ‘on the other side,’ ‘covering,’
and ‘completion’—are encoded by the same form. While the
relationship between these semantic units is motivated (Tyler
and Evans, 2003; Evans, 2015b), the units are nevertheless
distinct. But the consequence of English employing the same
form to encode a range of distinct—albeit semantically related—
meanings, is that English speakers perceive the semantic units
to form a coherent semantic range. In contrast, other languages
divide similar semantic space across different lexical items. The
consequence is that the appearance of semantic unity is just that,
an illusion, an artifact of the way in which individual languages
cut up and/or unify semantic space. It also provides further
evidence that language provides a level of semantic content
independent of the conceptual system, which it nuances during
the process of meaning construction.
Parametric vs. Analog Concepts
This discussion of the semantic content, derived via the linguistic
system, and distinct from non-linguistic concepts, brings us to the
design feature of linguistically mediated meaning construction
under discussion in this section. The semantic content associated
with a mental simulation appears to arise from a symbiotic
coupling of two qualitatively distinct knowledge types. For
instance, the content associated with so-called content words,
such as the open-class noun waiter, self-evidently, relate to
information “above” the level of language. When we imagine a
waiter, this involves rich information concerning the appearance,
dress, location, and tasks involved in being a waiter. Information
of this kind is multimodal in nature, involving information that
is sensorimotor and/or interoceptive. In short, it is analog—
the information called to mind approximates the veridical
“immersed” experience of perceiving and interacting with a
waiter (cf. Zwaan, 2004).
In contrast, the so-called function or grammatical words
and constructions concern information that is neither rich,
nor multimodal, in the same way. In fact, the information
conveyed is far more schematic in nature (Talmy, 2000;
Evans and Green, 2006; Evans, 2009, 2013; see also Bergen,
2012: Chapter 5). To illustrate, if we exclude the semantic
content associated with the open-class content words, in (3),
we are left with a type of schematic representation that is
not straightforwardly imageable, or perceptual. In short, the
representations associated with grammatical structure, appear
not to relate, in a straightforward way, with perceptual
representations. And yet, such representations are nevertheless
meaningful:
(3) Those decorators are ruining my walls
In (3), by excluding the content words—decorator, ruin and
wall—what remains is the function words, which I’ve highlighted
in bold font. These are the inflections –ing and –s and the lexical
items those, are, and my. In addition, the grammatical categories
noun and verb also encode schematic semantic units, those of
THING and PROCESS, independently of the specific lexical items
that fill them—decorator, wall and ruin (Langacker, 1987, 2008;
Evans, 2015b). So, the semantic representation of just these
closed-class elements, together with the syntactic configuration
in which they are embedded, can be captured as in (4):
(4) Those somethings are somethinging my somethings.
The gloss for this semantic representation can be provided as in
(5):
(5) More than one entity close to the speaker is presently in
the process of doing something to more than one entity
belonging to the speaker. This provides quite a lot of
semantic content.
That said, this semantic representation is, nevertheless, highly
schematic. We don’t have the details of the scene: we don’t
know what the entities in question are, nor do we know what
is being done by the agent to the patient. Nevertheless, this
illustration reveals the following: there appears to be a type of
semantic representation that is unique to the linguistic system.
Moreover, this representation provides information relating to
how a simulation should be constructed (see Bergen, 2012 for a
related point).
After all, the grammatical organization of the sentence entails
that the first entity is the agent and the second entity the
patient: the first entity is performing an action that affects
the second entity. This level of semantic representation derives
exclusively from language, rather than from representations in
the conceptual system. It provides a set of instructions as to
the relative significance, and the relation that holds, between the
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two entities in the sentence. In short, the function words and
the grammatical construction—in the sense of Goldberg (1995,
2006)—involves semantic content, albeit of a highly schematic
sort (Talmy, 2000; Evans, 2009).
This distinction, in terms of the nature of the content
associated with content words on the one hand, and function
elements on the other, constitutes the second design feature for
human meaning construction. Words like decorator, ruin and
wall give rise to rich experiences, which are analog in nature:
they relate to entities which we have directly experienced and
about which we retain detailed knowledge. Accordingly, I refer
to knowledge of that sort as analog concepts—concepts that are
directly grounded in the experiences that give rise to them. How
then does semantic structure (in language) differ from this level
of conceptual structure—which is to say, from analog concepts?
To illustrate, consider the use of the adjective red, and the
noun redness:
(6a) The bee sting caused a red mark on her hand.
(6b) The bee sting caused redness on her hand.
In both instances, the same perceptual hue is evoked, caused by
the toxin we attribute to bee stings. But the simulation associated
with the sentences is slightly distinct. In the first example, red,
an adjective, gives rise to an interpretation in which the person’s
hand has the property of being red, a consequence of the bee
sting. But in the second, the bee sting causes a particular ailment,
deriving from the use of the noun redness.
As we have seen, a noun encodes a semantic unit: THING;
this is what I refer to as a semantic parameter—a schematic
semantic ‘atom’ of meaning, one specialized for being encoded
in language (Evans, 2015b,c). In contrast, an adjective encodes
the parameter PROPERTY (OF A THING). The consequence
of the grammatical categories noun vs. adjective encoding
distinct parameters is that the way in which the conceptual
structure—the mental representation of red that resides in
the conceptual system—becomes activated is nuanced by the
language-specific representations—the parameters—encoded by
grammatical structure. In short, the interpretation deriving from
each of the examples in (6) diverges in subtle, albeit important
ways. The interpretation arising from (6a), that the perceptual
hue arises due to a skin property, is due to the use of the
adjective. In contrast, the interpretation in (6b), with a divergent
simulation, that of a skin ailment, is a consequence of the use
of the noun. Put another way, language provides a level of
knowledge that is more schematic—I use the term parametric—
than the rich, analog concepts—available from the conceptual
system. And these semantic parameters, specific to language, I
term parametric concepts.
My proposal is that analog concepts—which are semantic
representations that populate the conceptual system—in
evolutionary terms, had to precede the existence of language.
Parametric concepts constitute a species of concept that arose
as a consequence of the emergence of language. They provide a
level of schematic representation directly encoded by language:
parametric concepts guide how analog concepts are activated
and, consequently, how simulations are constructed in the service
of linguistically mediated meaning construction. For instance,
the forms red and redness both index the same perceptual
state(s). But they package the conceptual content in a different
way, giving rise to distinct simulations: redness = ailment;
red = property of skin. The schematic parametric concepts,
which is to say, that part of semantic representation that is native
to language, relates to THING vs. PROPERTY. Parametric concepts
are language-specific affordances, rather than affordances of the
conceptual system.
THE BIFURCATION IN LINGUISTIC
ORGANIZATION DESIGN FEATURE
While I’ve presented a proposal that there is a distinction
between two semantic representational systems—the conceptual
vs. the linguistic, which are each populated by qualitatively
distinct representations—analog vs. parametric—the second
design feature for linguistically mediated meaning construction
relates to language itself. Language exhibits a bifurcation in terms
of the nature of the linguistic symbols that populate it: the design
feature of a bifurcation in linguistic organization. And this design
feature is fundamental in terms of the enabling language to
engage with the representations in the conceptual system, and
hence, in terms of guiding the parcellation of analog knowledge
in meaning construction.
Two Types of Symbolic Reference
Language appears to employ two qualitatively distinct types of
symbolic reference (Evans, 2015b). The first constitutes what I
dub a words-to-world direction of symbolic reference: the type
of symbolic reference which de Saussure (1916) largely focused
on. In this type, signs are conventionally associated with specific
objects and events in the world, and/or in the mind of the
language user. The symbolic relation holds between a referential
vehicle from the linguistic system, and an entity or idea outside
the system. For instance, the English word /d6g/ refers to the
pet of choice for many western households, as represented in
Figure 1.
Figure 1 captures this type of relation. It shows that a
given sign—sign1, sign2, and so forth—is symbolically related to
objects and events in the world and/or the mind. The symbolic
relation, established by convention, is represented by the directed
arrow, connecting a particular sign with its referential target.
Importantly, the nature of the referential target constitutes a
potentially large body of knowledge that you and I may have
concerning dogs, knowledge which is dynamically updated: each
time you step outside your front door, and see a dog across the
street, your knowledge is updated, and the symbol refers not
just to specific exemplars of dogs, for instance, a Welsh Corgi,
depicted in Figure 1, but other breeds too. It may also include a
wide range of knowledge you possess concerning dogs, including
their behavior and life cycle, their appearance, their status in
human life and culture, as well as a plethora of information you’ll
have gleaned through direct experience with dogs, including dogs
you may have known, as well as information derived through
cultural transmission. Hence, the referential target of a sign in
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FIGURE 1 | A dog.
fact relates to a complex web of knowledge, what I term the
semantic potential of the target—developed in my theory of Access
Semantics (Evans, 2009, 2013, 2015b).
The second symbolic reference strategy involves what I dub a
words-to-words direction of symbolic reference (Figure 2). Here,
the symbolic relation holds not between a sign, and an entity
in the world and/or the mind. Instead, reference holds between
one linguistic symbol and another. To illustrate, consider the
following referring expression:
(7) a dog
While the noun phrase (NP), a dog, as a whole, refers in a
words-to-world direction, the indefinite article refers to the noun
(N), dog: it has a words-to-words direction of reference. Indeed,
the semantic function of the indefinite article is specialized
for words-to-word reference: whatever it is that the symbol,
dog, refers to, the indefinite article tells us that the sign
to which it refers, in this case, dog, is both univalent—
there’s just one of it—and non-specific—the hearer can’t be
expected to have specific information about the entity; it is
for this reason that the symbol a is termed the ‘indefinite’
article.
One way of thinking about the indefinite article is that, in part,
it encodes a schematic slot—what has been termed an elaboration
site (Langacker, 1987) –which is completed by a noun. In short,
the English indefinite article requires a noun to elaborate it, and
hence to complete its meaning. Notice that while the overall
function of the referring expression—a dog—is to identity an
individual entity in the world—a words-to-world direction of
reference—the English symbol a is specialized for a words-to-
words direction: it assumes a distinction in lexical classes, such
as noun vs. indefinite article.
FIGURE 2 | Words-to-world symbolic reference.
FIGURE 3 | Two types of symbolic reference.
Now consider a more complex example of words-to-words
symbolic reference, focusing on the noun aim, in the following
attested example:
(8) The Government’s aim is to make GPs more financially
accountable, in charge of their own budgets, as well as to
extend the choice of the patient. (Schmid, 2000).
In (8), aim can be thought of as a shell noun (Schmid, 2000)—it
refers to the entire conceptual complex that I’ve underlined. The
underlined portion of the discourse chunk, whilst, on the face of
it, relating to a complex set of ideas, is encapsulated as a coherent
conceptual whole. Importantly, this is achieved via word-to-word
symbolic reference: the noun, aim, provides a linguistic “shell,”
enabling reference to the complex idea that it points to. Evidence
for this function comes from the next sentence in the discourse,
which I present below:
(9) The Government’s aim is to make GPs more financially
accountable, in charge of their own budgets, as well as to
extend the choice of the patient. Under this new scheme,
family doctors are required to produce annual reports for
their patients. . .(Schmid, 2000).
Having established a shell noun complex—the underlined
portion—by virtue of a referring shell noun, aim, it is then
possible to continue treating the complex as a single coherent
conceptual entity, in ongoing discourse. Evidence for this comes
from the new shell NP, this new scheme, which, again, I’ve
highlighted in (9). This shell NP refers back to the underlined
shell noun complex, established by the symbol aim, in the first
sentence of the discourse chunk. In short, both aim and this new
scheme refer symbolically in a words-to-words fashion, providing
a means of packaging a complex idea—a shorthand mnemonic—
without the need to continue to spell out the entire idea itself.
Language, then, appears to make use both of words-to-
world and words-to-words types of symbolic reference. Figure 3
captures both directions of symbolic reference.
These two types of symbolic reference, exploited by language,
are qualitatively different: words-to-words symbolic reference
is more abstract than words-to-world symbolic reference. This
follows as reference in this direction is to another symbol, rather
than to an idea or entity in the world (or mind) per se. It presumes
the existence of a linguistic level of semantic representation
which can be referred to, independently of entities in the world.
Moreover, this distinction reflects a fundamental design feature
of language: the distinction between a lexical system and a
grammatical system.
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How do the Two Reference Strategies
Contribute to Meaning Construction?
The words-to-world referential strategy constitutes our ability
to use linguistic symbols to cue or activate representations in
the conceptual system. In contrast, the words-to-words strategy
constitutes the means, afforded by the linguistic system, to
construct the semantic scaffolding for a simulation. The semantic
scaffolding enables the relevant part of the conceptual system’s
vast semantic potential to become activated during meaning
construction. In short, words-to-words reference provides the
basis for words-to-world reference to narrow in on just that
aspect of the conceptual system that is relevant for linguistically
situated meaning construction, as when the word red, in (1)
enabled activation of two distinct perceptual hues. To illustrate
the way in which this works, consider the following linguistic
example:
(10) A waiter served the customers.1
This sentence features words, and other linguistic constructions,
that serve two distinct reference strategies. Let’s consider the
words-to-world strategy first. This strategy equates, in linguistic
terms with the so-called content words in the sentence. I’ve
highlighted these in bold in (15):
(11) A waiter served the customers.
A content word, as discussed earlier, usually taken to be a word
that concerns rich content. In (11) these are the nouns waiter
and customer, and the verb serve. These words relate to relatively
rich aspects of the scene being described, in particular, the
participants in the scene and the relationship that holds between
them. Moreover, we are able to map these words onto rich and
detailed scenarios, stored in the conceptual system, relating to our
experience of interacting in the world. We each have rich, and
varied experiences of restaurants, eateries and other venues that
sell food for consumption in situ, including the format and moves
involved in such service encounters. We know that a waiter is
someone who liaises with the customer on choice of food, and
the kitchen where the food is prepared. The waiter’s function
is to communicate with both parties, and to deliver the food,
once prepared, to be consumed by the customer, in return for
pay, and often, for a tip. In short, these content words encode
a words-to-world relation: they enable language users to map
the words onto specific participants and the relations holding
between them; in slightly different terms, they facilitate to the
rich analog knowledge that resides in the conceptual system:
knowledge we have about a restaurant frame.
In contrast, the sentence also consists of function words
and grammatical constructions (within which the content and
function elements are embedded). I’ve placed the function
elements in bold in (12):
(12) A waiter served the customers.
Function words encompass those schematic notions which, in the
most simplistic of terms, aren’t imageable. For instance, while
1Example based on Evans (2009, p. 102).
we can call to mind, should we wish, a waiter or a customer, or
imagine what is entailed by a waiter serving a customer, it’s not
clear what is called to mind by grammatical words such as a, or
the, the past tense marker –ed, or the bound plural morpheme –
s. These elements, on their own, are specialized not for indexing
particular entities in the world per se. Rather, their function is to
say something about how we should interpret the other words
in the sentence that they relate to. For instance, the past tense
marker constrains our interpretation of the verb serve: it situates
the serving event as having taken place before now. But in this
way, the past tense marker is guiding the way in which, whatever
it is in our conceptual system that serve facilitates access to,
the way this knowledge becomes activated. Similarly, the plural
marker provides a means of interpreting the free morpheme, the
noun customer, to which it is morphologically bound.
One line of evidence for distinguishing between content
and function words, between words-to-world and words-to-
words reference, takes the following form: if we change the
content words, we obtain a different scene, yet the structural
elements, provided by words-to-words reference, remain the
same. Consider the following:
(13) A rockstar smashed the guitars.
In (13), when changing just the three content words an
entirely different experiential complex—a simulation—arises,
one involving a rockstar smashing guitars. This reveals that the
function of words-to-world reference concerns people, things,
events, properties of things and events, and so on. But the
semantic scaffolding remains the same, as the words-to-words
relations are unchanged: a, -d, the and-s. These aspects of the
sentence concerns whether the participants (rockstar/guitars)
evoked can be easily identified by the interlocutor (the use of the
indefinite article a vs. the definite article the), that the event took
place before now (the used of the past tense marker, -d), and how
many participants were involved (the presence, or absence, of the
plural marker –s).
Moreover, the semantic scaffolding provided by words-to-
words reference encompasses more than just the function words.
It also includes the full range of grammatical constructions in
which the content words participate. This includes the lexical
class in which words participate: waiter and customer are nouns,
while serve is a verb, as well as word order—in these example
sentences, we have a declarative word order. And finally, the
sentences all invoke active, rather than passive voice. In each case,
these grammatical constructions—lexical class, word order, and
voice—all facilitate a words-to-words referential strategy: they
constrain how we should interpret the participants in the event,
and the nature of the relationship holding between them.
Let’s focus on lexical class first. Consider the following
expressions:
(14a) thumb a lift
(14b) lift a thumb
While the expressions in (14) involve the same phonological
forms, lift and thumb belong to different lexical classes in each
expression. In (14a) thumb is a verb, and lift is a noun. In contrast,
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in (14b) lift is a verb and thumb a noun. This follows because, one
of the things we happen to know about English is that the article
typically precedes a noun. And on the basis of this distributional
analysis, lift, in (14a) and thumb in (14b) are nouns. Moreover,
because we also know that verbs can serve an imperative function,
especially when they appear in first position in an expression,
thumb is a verb in (14a), while lift is a verb in (14b).
Now, the fact that the same phonological forms can shift
their lexical class, as they do in these examples, reveals that the
lexical classes, noun vs. verb, is a functional category independent
of the phonological forms themselves. The categories noun vs.
verb have functional significance independently of their lexical
instantiations, and serve to constrain how we should interpret the
phonological forms, and their referential targets, in each case. In
(18a), consequently, the scene involves a hitch-hiking scenario,
whilst in (14b) a different scenario is evoked, involving physical
movement of someone’s anatomy.
Similarly, the declarative word order in (10) signals that the
scenario being evoked is one that the speaker knows, or assumes
to be true, and is presenting it as such to the interlocutor. If
we alter the word order, by adding the function word did so
that waiter is no longer the first element in the sentence, as in
(15), we no longer have a declarative construction, but rather an
interrogative. And now we have a different perspective on the
scenario: the speaker is no longer presenting the scenario as fact,
but, in fact, signaling that they don’t know whether the scenario
is true.
(15) Did a waiter serve the customers?
What this shows is that the declarative, and indeed, interrogative
word orders, in English constrain in rather important ways
the way the information—the words-to-world strategy— is
being packaged. Moreover, the ideational function and hence
interactive-interpersonal function of both sentences is rather
different: (15) invites a response in a way that (10) doesn’t.
And finally, active voice designates a particular point of view,
which constrains the nature of the relationship holding between
the participants in a scene. In (10), the point of view is being
designated as located with the agent—the waiter. If we change
the grammatical construction to passive, as in (16), the point
of view is now situated with the customers, even though the
waiter remains the active participant—the agent—in the words-
to-world relation designated:
(16) The customers were served by a waiter.
The upshot of all this is that while the content of the
simulation is achieved by language working to provide a
structure for analog concepts—the scaffolding upon which the
scene is constructed—language both affects, and consequently
transforms, in significant ways non-linguistic content; in short,
the conceptual content is packaged, for communicative purposes
in the course of linguistically mediated meaning construction,
by virtue of language-specific representations. Table 1 provides
a summary of what is conveyed by function words for sentence
(14), whilst Table 2 provides a summary from the perspective of
analog concepts, accessed by content words (see Evans, 2009).
Linguistic Access to the Conceptual
Meaning Potential
The lexical vs. grammatical subsystems can be analyzed in terms
of words-to-world and words-to-words alignment, and in terms
of analog vs. parametric knowledge. And this provides the critical
design feature for meaning construction.
I have argued that analog knowledge does not in fact coming
from language: the distinction between lexicon and grammar
provides a design feature for access to the conceptual system—
open-class words provide access, while the grammatical system
TABLE 1 | Content deriving from words-to-world referring expressions.
Phonological vehicle Words-to-world relation
Waiter Person with a particular function, and sometimes appearance, who works in a particular setting
Serve Particular mode of activity involving two or more people and, typically, an entity with which one of the participants is provided by the other
Customer Person who is provided with a particular object or service (of various sorts) in exchange for, typically, money
TABLE 2 | Content deriving from words-to-words referring expressions.
Phonological vehicle Words-to-word relation
A Introduces a referent which the hearer is held to be unable to readily identify (from context or preceding discourse)
A Designates a unitary instantiation of the referent
The Introduces a referent which the hearer is held to be able to readily identify (from context or preceding discourse)
–s Designates multiple instantiations of a referent
Lexical class: verb (for serve) Designates entity as an event (as one possibility)
Lexical class: noun (for waiter/customer) Designates entity as an object (as one possibility)
Grammatical relation: subject (for waiter) Designates entity as being the primary or focal entity in a designated relationship
Grammatical relation: object (for customers) Designates entity as less important or secondary entity in a designated relationship
Active voice (through verb form) Designates point of view being situated at the agent
Declarative word order Speaker knows the situation to be true and asserts it to the hearer
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facilitates the parcellation of analog knowledge to which open
class words facilitate access. In short, a class of lexical elements,
which I have loosely referred to as content words, and in English,
associated most notably, but perhaps not exclusively with the
‘big four’—noun, verb, adjective and adverb—facilitate access
to analog knowledge, to the conceptual system. On this Access
Semantics account (aka The Theory of Lexical Concepts and
Cognitive models, or LCCM Theory, developed in Evans, 2009,
2013, 2015a), language has a ready-made means of facilitating
access to a type of knowledge not present within the linguistic
system. It can reuse existing knowledge, evolved for other
means than communication, for purposes of communication.
The words-to-words function of the grammatical subsystem
enables the parcellation of analog knowledge and hence a means
of sophisticated meaning construction. As we’ve seen, knowledge
of this type is schematic, providing a semantic scaffolding that
nuances the analog information, giving rise to complex and
subtle meaning, as in the distinction between a skin condition
rather than unwanted colouration of the skin, as in the examples
in (6).
On this account, a subset of linguistic symbols provide access
to the conceptual system: in both words-to-world, and words-to-
words directions; red and redness provide both types of symbolic
reference. The parcellation of knowledge associated with analog
information is driven by the parametric content conventionally
associated with these forms: whether the perceptual hue is
interpreted as a property of an entity or an entity in its own right,
reified independently of whatever it happens to be a property of.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have examined proposals for two central
design features of the human capacity for linguistically mediated
meaning construction: a bifurcation in semantic representation,
and a bifurcation in linguistic organization. The striking claim
to emerge is that language is tightly coupled with non-linguistic
representations, in the conceptual system, which evolved not for
communication. But language has evolved in order to bootstrap
these representations for linguistically mediated communication.
The over-arching design feature of the human meaning-
making capacity amounts to two distinct representational
systems: the conceptual system and the linguistic system. Each
system contributes to meaning construction in qualitatively
distinct ways. The second is, given that the two systems
are representational—they are populated by semantic
representations—the nature and function of the representations
are qualitatively different. After all, as a linguistic system has a
different function, vis-à-vis the conceptual system, which is of far
greater evolutionary antiquity, then the semantic representations
are complementary, and as such, qualitatively different, reflecting
the functional distinctions of the two systems, in collectively
giving rise to meaning.
And finally, language itself is adapted to the conceptual
system—the semantic potential—that it marshals in the meaning
construction process. Hence, a linguistic system itself exhibits a
bifurcation, in terms of the symbolic resources at its disposal.
This relates to two distinct reference strategies available to
linguistic symbols: words-to-world reference and words-to-
words reference. In slightly different terms, this design feature of
language amounts to a distinction between a lexical subsystem,
and a grammatical subsystem.
The overall conclusion to emerge from this discussion
is the following. The ideational function of language—its
communicative potential—is, in large measure, a function of
the way in which it is adapted to, and interfaces with the
conceptual system. Rather than language being a distinct
module or faculty of mind, it subserves meaning construction
through a close and symbiotic relationship with the conceptual
system: it has evolved and is designed to exploit those non-
linguistic representations for purposes of linguistically mediated
communication. But to achieve this, it has evolved a means of
words-to-words symbolic reference—a grammatical capacity—
which appears to be a species-specific trait. And it is the
parametric knowledge units, associated with morphosyntax
and lexical items, that enables our species to harness the
otherwise mute semantic potential of concepts in order to convey
meaning.
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